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Abstract 
Electric utility business models are changing to integrate new technologies and distributed 
energy resources (DER). Diversifying energy mix and customer choices are both novel and 
useful in understanding key drivers of this transformation, including distribution system 
planning and customer-service options. Practical implementation of these solutions, however, 
shows that without proper planning, energy diversification could come at very high social 
and economic costs. For example, regulators have been slow in implementing policy, 
regulatory, and business model constructs that promote customer choice to animate high 
levels of grid reliability and resiliency. Equally important is how viable existing utility 
business models are to navigating transformation processes, including strategic resource 
management, revenue model, customer interface, and value propositions. This chapter 
discusses our use of the Hamel business model to offer strategic analysis of Reforming the 
Energy Vision (REV), which is aimed at decarbonizing New York’s energy sector and 
increasing customer choice and control. Specifically, we build from existing literature to argue 
that implementing distribution management systems (DMS) in which customer choice and 
DERs are prominent requires a shared or ‘polycentric,’ networked business-model 
innovations that build on capabilities and preferences of existing institutions to meet the 
growing demand for electricity services and utility strategic goals. 
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1. Introduction 
The electric utility landscape is experiencing rapid and unprecedented transformation. A 
powerful confluence of structural, technological, and socio-economic factors is driving this 
change. Distributed technologies (e.g., distributed generation, energy storage, flexible 
demand, and advanced power electronics) are competing in the emerging distributed utilities 
market and, as a result, putting pressure on investors and regulators to consider utility choice 
management (UCM) opportunities that promote more capital-efficient options for the 
provision of electricity services [1]. The second installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review 
(QER), released in the winter of 2017, recommends spending $300-$500 billion in grid 
modernization, noting that it “is the platform for the 21st-century electricity system, bringing 
significant value associated with lower electricity bills due to fuel and efficiency savings, more 
electricity choices, and fewer and shorter outages” [2]. The QER also recommends that 
utilities deploy a “wide range of new, capital-intensive technologies” to modernize their aging 
infrastructure, and to “support increased reliability, security, value creation, consumer 
preferences, and system optimization and integration at the distribution level.” At the 
distribution utility level, the electric utility faces a fundamental challenge. Besides 
investments needed for grid modernization, the emergent role of the consumer as prosumer 
coupled with new priorities, such as enhancing electricity reliability, affordability, resilience, 
environmental protection, and grid security, are driving the current evolution in the industry 
and destabilizing the century-old government-regulated, vertically integrated, monopoly 
business model that is the energy utility. 
The pressure to revamp the electric utility landscape is evident not only in the contiguous 
United States—for example, New York, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and North 
Carolina—but also in Hawaii and Alaska [3]. The dominating trend of fast-flexing renewable 
energy sources, mostly solar and wind power, continues to underpin early retirement of 
baseload power-generating sources such as nuclear, coal, and natural gas steam generator [4]. 
The growth of solar and wind power, flat or declining electricity demand, and cheap natural 
gas have been cited as the reasons for the decline in electricity prices and economic viability 
of baseload energy generation sources such as nuclear energy [5,6] and thus declining 
revenues for utility generators. As a result, strategic improvement of utility structure and 
planning to create new choices for customers requires explicit recognition and response to 
these challenges as well as local and regional idiosyncratic design and operational obstacles. 
For instance, utilities across the country face distinctive characterizations of the so-called 
‘death spiral’ - the cycle of eroding market share to distributed energy prosumers that raises 
costs on remaining utility customers, leading to accelerated market losses [7,8]. Nationwide, 
the ‘death spiral’ debate is substantial. According to Accenture, estimated utility sector 
revenue erosion in the United States resulting from increased distributed generation and 
gains in energy efficiency could be between $18-$48 billion by 2025, depending on status quo, 
demand disruption, or perfect storm assumptions [9] (Figures 1 and 2). However, this debate 
continues with varied levels of concerns across states and regional electricity markets like PJM 
Interconnection, Midcontinent (MISO), Texas (ERCOT), California (CAISO), New England 
(ISO-NE), and New York (NYISO). The effect of the dreaded ‘death spiral,’ if it materializes, 
will be felt differently across the nation’s utilities. Similarly, aging infrastructure concern due 
to long periods of low investments in grid modernization, changing supply and demand 
profiles, and investments in research and development (R&D) commitments are not 
geographically ubiquitous [2,6,10].  
 
Figure 1. Estimated erosion of utility revenue 
 
Recent studies by McKinsey & Company conclude that energy storage is already economical 
for many commercial customers [11]. Rapidly falling solar photovoltaics (PV) prices coupled 
with low-cost storage will create an increasing number of residential and commercial 
customers who will meet their electric service needs through distributed generation. Falling 
storage prices have the potential to transform the power landscape by smoothing out the 
variations in power associated with variable electricity power, such as solar and wind, and 
achieve 24/7 reliability. Robert Frew et al. (2016) review pathways to a highly renewable U.S. 
electricity future and observe that design of policies such as RPS (renewable portfolio 
standard) targets, FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) orders, emission 
regulations, greater regional coordination and geographic aggregation, and energy storage is 
critical to the emergent distributed electricity market [12]. While there is disagreement on the 
structure of electricity market design, regional coordination planning, flexibility mechanisms 
required to help mitigate the variability and uncertainty challenges arising from a high 
penetration of intermittent electricity generation, and how soon and how fast a highly 
renewable electricity future can occur, the trend is similar for many parts of the United States. 
Several response strategies have emerged shaped by policy, market, public oversight, and 
financing support. These include utility-as-platform models like the New York Public Service 
Commission’s (NYPSC) grid and market modernization initiative called Reforming the 
Energy Vision (REV), utility as a smart integrator, and electric services operator model [13]. 
The New York’s REV vision recognizes that the path for a distributed utility model which 
promotes a highly renewable electricity future in the state will not be linear. Hence, the vision 
lays out multiple sets of solutions to various aspects of electricity market design and 
 
Figure 2. How the adoption of energy demand-disrupting technologies could erode energy 
demand and utilities’ revenues through 2040 
 operations, taking into consideration utility market composition and regulatory structures. 
This paper evaluates a typology of policy, regulatory, and business model constructs for 
diversifying energy mix and utility choices, arguing for a polycentric approach to carry out 
utility business-model innovation and electric power market design that might allow this 
suggested future to play out in the real world. Section 2 discusses challenges, limitations, and 
opportunities of utility-side and customer-side business models. Section 3 evaluates the 
Hamel framework, and Section 4 applies this framework to the New York’s REV. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Business models 
The business model concept offers a valuable unit for evaluating new market ventures and 
business practice [14-16]. There is no universally accepted definition of a business model. 
However, authors in different industries have proposed a litany of definitions. Reference [17] 
defines a business model as “the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, and 
captures value” while [18] describes a business model as “the heuristic logic that connects 
technical potential with the realization of economic value.” Reference [19] defines a business 
model as “a representation of the underlining core logic and strategic choices for creating and 
capturing value within a value network.” As an analytic tool, the concept has been widely 
used in studying investors’ preference for service-driven business models [15], energy service 
company (ESCO) [16], micro-generation solutions [20], the distributed electricity generation 
market [21], energy efficiency programs [22], evolution of energy utilities [23], and the 
ongoing expansion of distributed electricity generation market [24]. As a result, the business 
model concept has been widely tested in practice in the energy sector. Common components 
of the business model include the value chain, value propositions, target markets, competitive 
strategy, revenue-generation models, customer interface, value network, and infrastructure 
service [18,25].  
2.2. Business-model innovation 
Business-model innovation as a term remains largely vague. Reference [25] notes that 
business-model innovation is less a matter of superior foresight, but more of trial and error 
and ex-post adaptation. Reference [26] suggests that it entails business model 
experimentation, while [27] views it as a strategic renewal mechanism for organizations 
undergoing through periods of transformation in their external environment [28]. In this 
chapter, business-model innovation refers to the development of new organizational forms to 
create, deliver, and capture value for realizing a distributed utilities future. Electric utilities in 
New York and elsewhere have different starting points, value propositions, customer 
expectations (across customer classes), and priorities, and they vary significantly with respect 
to electricity revenues, electricity sales, and customer-base. How can utilities meet these 
demanding business expectations in an uncertain environment? Fox-Penner (2010) offers a 
solution through a “two-and-a-half-business model” innovation as an alternative [13,28]. The 
half refers to a smart integrator scenario in which the utility operating the power grid does 
not own or sell the power delivered by the grid. Consequently, power generation and grid 
infrastructure development including its information and control systems are community-
owned (e.g., a community micro-grid). The advantage of a community-owned distributed 
generation is its potential for economies of scale. Hundreds to thousands of customers join 
the network participating as both consumers and producers (or prosumers) of renewable 
electricity from sources like solar PV and wind turbines. These prosumers use the set 
operational standards, but the financing and administration side of the business model is 
handled separately by the utility. 
With that in mind, our research shows that aligning core business incentives of electricity 
distribution utilities with cost-effective integration of DERs into power systems is a 
prerequisite for achieving DMS and UCM business model constructs that might allow this 
future to come about, arguing for a ‘polycentric’ approach in the near term. As a preliminary 
matter, it is commonly noted that the smart integrator model has well-developed analytic 
capabilities to ensure the electric grid can meet electricity demand at all times. The smart 
integrator model also has a green dispatch mechanism that enables utilities to determine 
when and how to switch to low-carbon energy sources such as solar, wind, and hydroelectric 
power. Therefore, the only key obligation of the utility is ensuring that the local grid meets 
power demanded in the system. Second, the smart integrator has a “highly secure but 
maximally open platform for information, price, and control signals” [13]. This feature 
ensures that it responds well to different regulatory regimes by integrating information for 
accounting, billing, and settlement systems to accommodate the more complicated functions 
such as managing pricing plans, payment, and billing. Related to the smart integrator model 
is the Energy Services Utility (ESU), which is an extension of the smart integrator model. In 
the ESU model, the focus of the utility shifts from being a purely asset- and commodity-driven 
entity to a service and value-added enterprise in which profit achievement hinges on the 
services offered to consumers [13,15,28]. Examples of the ESU business model include 
programs offered by Arizona Public Service Electric Company (the largest electric utility in 
Arizona), including energy storage, demand response, and load management. 
Under a smart integrator, utilities must consider creating different triads of structure, 
regulation, and revenue models to facilitate transformation to a distributed utilities future. 
This process requires a variety of innovations, including joint construction and developments 
of electricity generation and delivery of electricity services such as financing and building 
related assets, ownership, and operations; growth of diversified independent transmission 
companies; diversified of generation mix with high composition of low-carbon resources 
mostly from natural gas and renewables such as hybrid solar PV systems, polygeneration 
energy systems, or zero-net energy systems; use of subsidiaries to speed up clean energy 
diversification; and use of utility consortia that expand member utilities’ service offerings 
beyond the provision of electricity service (e.g., to cater to cooperative customers). 
2.3. Utility-side versus customer-side business model 
Two principal factors concern utilities. First, electricity must get to the customer reliably and 
safely. Second, power must be delivered efficiently to maximize profit margins. These factors 
put pressure on struggling utilities to minimize electric grid system losses. Utility-side 
business models, concepts, components, and technologies therefore ought to take these 
factors into consideration. With the growth of prosumers, the challenge then becomes: which 
key policy, market, and business concerns should utilities prioritize? Other salient challenges 
include optimal deployment of expensive assets, need for diversification of generation, 
demand response management, grid stability, and tariff implementation. Some of these 
challenges can be addressed by deploying ‘smart’ technologies at the utility-side to monitor 
operations and improve billing and tariff management. In states with fast changing electric 
utility landscapes such as New York, however, regulators need to identify and deconstructed 
elements of innovations in a contextually-appropriate manner to assure scalable solutions.  
Reference [29] examines a suite of wholesale power market design currently in use on the 
customer-side to improve electricity reliability, security, and flexibility. It also assesses 
feasibility of wholesale market design with high penetration of DERs considering the role of 
technological innovations such as demand response, distributed generation, and energy 
storage. These technologies support the infrastructure needed to provide electricity services 
and address critical challenges such as climate change, energy security, and revenue erosion 
[2]. The revenue erosion concern can also be addressed through customer-side renewable 
electricity business models. In this chapter, distributed generation systems refers to small-
scale generation systems (e.g., for private customers and small- to medium-sized businesses) 
in the range of a few kilowatts to about 5MW from sources such as solar PV, micro-wind 
turbines, and micro-combined heat and gas-power systems. Accordingly, customer-side and 
utility-side business models follow a very different logic in the value chain: the former is 
based on many small projects while the latter focuses on a small number of large projects. 
Table 1 summarizes the differences of the two models [30,31]. 
 Customer-side business model Utility-side business model 
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• Better customer relationship 
needed to develop new value 
propositions. 
• Changes in customer segments. 
• New channels are needed. 
• Customer hosts energy 
generation system and shares 
the benefits with the utility. 
• Long-term customer 
relationship. 
• Utility-customer relationship remains 
unchanged. 
• Customer segmentation leads to 
increased customer base and “eco” 
price premium earnings. 
• Channels remain the same 
• Electricity is treated as a commodity. 
• Customer does not host energy 
generation systems. 
• Customer pays per unit. 
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• Shift from commodity delivery 
to energy service provider. 
• New value propositions needed 
for the market. 
• Bulk generation of electricity 
supplied to the grid. 
• Additional energy related services 
and customer value. 
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 • Large number of small-scale 
assets. 
• Generation close to consumers. 
• Experienced in small-scale 
energy projects. 
• Partnerships with system 
suppliers and local installers. 
• Small number of large-scale assets. 
• Centralized generation. 
• Experienced in large-scale 
infrastructure projects. 
• Partnerships with project developers 
and suppliers. 
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ve
nu
e 
M
od
el
 
• Revenue from direct use, feed-
in and/or from services. 
• High transaction costs reduce 
profit margins. 
• New revenue models needed. 
• Complex electric cost structure 
more due to many small 
investments instead of few 
large investments. 
• Revenues through feed-in of 
electricity. 
• Economies of scale from large 
projects and project portfolios. 
• Revenue models are available. 
• Electric cost structures are in favor of 
utilities experiences with large-scale 
infrastructure financing. 
Table 1. Utility-side versus customer-side business model 
Unlocking greater value of distributed utilities requires new business models that improves 
ownership, asset management, and monetization of utility assets. In the utility-controlled and 
utility-owned value arrangement, utilities continue to execute their core competency 
functions, for example, asset ownership and operation. For instance, New York State’s (NYS) 
clean energy standard (CES) provides for a “50 by 30” goal, which commits the state to 
procure 50% of its electricity from renewable resources by 2030. Each load-serving entity is 
required to procure for their retail customers renewable energy credits (RECs) linked to DERs 
listed in Tier 1 (e.g., solar, wind, biomass, and pumped storage hydroelectric) [32]. Likewise, 
the customer-side structure provides RECs management; utilities can bundle them into 
programs, such as green pricing plans, and sell them to other parties. 
3. The Hamel framework for utility business model evaluation 
A fundamental challenge facing New York today is how to generate richer innovations at all 
levels, including products, business models, and management systems that transform a 
centralized power system into a high-performing distributed utility sector. The critical 
challenge in this endeavor, however, entails fashioning a comprehensive analytical 
framework that captures components of business model across the entirety of the market 
spectrum. To avoid the pitfall of ambiguous strategy in such a framework, a service-based 
business model approach should be adopted. Reference [33] identifies six key functions of 
business model strategy as value proposition, revenue generation mechanism(s), value chain, 
value network, target market, and a competitive strategy, while [19] lists the four often-cited 
business model components: strategic resources, value creation, value capture, and value 
network. Hamel business model [34], which is applied in this chapter, incorporates these 
fundamental features, providing a robust framework (Figure 3) for analyzing the REV vision. 
It appears that REV is based on a polycentric paradigm as the main pathway with which 
utility market reorganization will be navigated. Several studies have already explored UCM 
governance approaches with polycentric characteristics e.g. [35-39]. These contributions 
largely focus on bending reality, business model constructs, and institutional and near-term 
governance as an impetus for polycentric innovation. We argue here that so long as utility 
regulation and governance lag behind technology innovation, institutional innovations 
needed to support the industry to “become more adept at generating richer innovations at 
other levels, including products, services, business models, and management systems,” will 
continue to play catch up thus impeding the full participation of DER resources [40]. 
 
Figure 3. Components of Hamel business model framework 
Hamel’s business model is comprised of four major components (i.e., core strategy, strategic 
resources, customer interface, and value network), three bridge components (customer 
benefits, configuration, and company boundaries), and sub-elements that determine the 
profit potential (efficiency, uniqueness, fit, and profit boosters). The first component, a core 
strategy, is the essence of how a firm chooses to compete. The sub-element, or the business 
mission, captures the overall objective of the strategy or what the business model is designed 
to accomplish or deliver. According to the Hamel framework, the business mission defines 
the decisions of a firm, such as the value proposition, strategic intent, purpose, goals, and 
overall performance objectives. Therefore, when a company changes its business mission, this 
does not necessarily imply innovation in business concept. 
The product/market scope defines where the firm competes (i.e., the firm’s competitive arena). 
For instance, the scope determines the customers, geographies, and product segments [38]. In 
this regard, the definition of product/market scope can be a source of business concept 
innovation for a firm—especially when it is entirely different from that of traditional 
competitors [34]. Finally, basis for differentiation captures how the firm or organization 
competes differently from its competitors. For instance, a firm differentiates itselft from 
competitors by seeking answers to questions such as: how do opponents differentiate 
themselves in the electricity market (e.g., in designing utility revenue models such as platform 
service revenues, rate design, and customer energy data usage)? Are there other dimensions 
of market-oriented revenue model differentiations that could be explored? In what aspects of 
the energy service (e.g., rate design) has there been the least differentiation? How could 
differentiation be increased in some of these dimensions (e.g., by implementing opt-in rate 
initiatives such as time-of-use rates or smart home rates)? And have differentiation 
opportunities been diligently sought in every dimension of the business model? 
Hamel’s second major component, strategic or unique firm-specific resources, constitutes a source 
of competitive advantage. Fundamentally transforming the market to increase renewable 
electricity generation in New York is a source of business concept innovation. A successful 
business model thus creates its own intellectual hegemony. Strategic resources embody core 
competencies, and comprises skills and unique capabilities. Strategic assets depicts what is 
owned by the firm. They are rare and valuable things other than know-how, and include 
brand, patents, infrastructure, proprietary standards, and customer data. A prudent firm-
wide use of strategic assets can lead to business concept innovation. According to [41], 
asymmetry in the resources a firm controls and discretionary managerial decisions about 
resource development and deployment can be sources of sustainable economic rent. On the 
other hand, core processes illustrate what people in the firm do. They are methodologies and 
routines used in translating competencies, assets, and other inputs into customer value. A 
reconfiguration of central components and core processes in the business model therefore 
constitutes business concept innovation [42]. 
The third major component of the Hamel framework is customer interface. It is comprised of 
four elements: (a) fulfillment and support, which describes market access (i.e., how the firm 
reaches the market and it includes channels, customer support, and service levels); (b) 
information and insight, which refers to knowledge that is collected from customers and the 
ability of the organization to extract insights from this information to design new products 
and services for customers; (c) relationship dynamics refers to the nature of interaction between 
the firm (producer) and the customers; and (d) pricing structure specifies the revenue 
mechanism for monetizing services rendered (i.e., flat-rate charges or charges based on TOU).  
The fourth component is the value network of the firm. This includes suppliers, partners, and 
coalitions that complement and strengthen organization’s resources. Suppliers typically 
reside “up the value chain” from the producer [34]. The configuration of activities is a bridge 
component that links the organizations’ core strategy to its strategic resources. Configuration 
of activities specifies unique ways in which core competencies, strategic assets, and core 
processes interrelate to support a chosen strategy and how those linkages are managed in 
order to achieve greater value. Intermediating between the core strategy and customer 
interface is another bridge component—the customer benefits—which describes the bundle of 
benefits that is essentially offered to consumers. Company boundaries refers to decisions 
regarding what the firm does internally based on what it contracts out to the value network. 
At the base of the framework are four factors that define the utility of the Hamel business 
model. Efficiency guarantees that the value of benefits delivered to customers exceeds their 
production costs. Uniqueness demonstrates the level of convergence among business models 
in terms of conception and execution in ways that add valued to customers; the greater the 
convergence among business models, the lower the potential for above-average profits. Fit 
means that all the elements of the business model are consistent and mutually reinforcing, 
and that all the parts work together for the same end goal. Finally, profit booster(s) include 
increasing returns, competitor lock out, strategic economies, and strategic flexibility. 
Positioning the Hamel business model as the unit for analysis of market reorientation in 
electric industry thus provides a robust and multi-dimensional framework for evaluating the 
suitability of new proposals for electric utilities and energy governance in in New York. 
4. Evaluating the REV docket: The détente for utilities and DER 
Initiated in 2014, New York’s REV program is a comprehensive effort to reform the state’s 
energy system in order to align ownership, management, and operation of its utility industry 
[43, 44]. REV is led by NYPSC and seeks to fundamentally transform the electric power sector 
of New York state from a primarily centralized generation system to distributed utilities 
model [45]. The REV docket has two tracks. Track 1 focuses on the development of DER 
markets and the utility-as-platform model known as distributed-system platform (DSP) 
providers, while Track 2 focuses on reforming utility-ratemaking practices and revenue 
streams to accommodate the proposed DSP model. Implementation of REV will take several 
years and will involve the mutual efforts of industry, customers, non-profit organization, and 
regulatory partners. The initiative encourages regulatory changes that promote energy 
efficiency, demand response, increase storage capacity, and increase renewable energy 
resources. These reforms empower end-users by providing more choices through 
diversification of energy resources, and by fostering improvement in the performance of the 
power sector across policy objectives such as system-wide efficiency, system reliability and 
resiliency, enhanced customer billing system, market animation and leverage of customer 
contributions, fuel and resource diversity, and reduction of carbon emissions [44]. 
Richard Kauffman, chair of the state's Energy Research Development Authority (NYSERDA) 
and former NYPSC Chair Audrey Zibelman explain that the REV program is “removing 
market barriers and bridging market gaps that have historically impeded the clean energy 
sector from benefiting from technological innovations” [46]. Its major impact on the industry 
so far has been increased integration of solar- and wind -energy generations. Therefore, this 
evaluation focuses on the regulations and directives specified by the NYPSC, and other 
guidelines released by key power utilities in the state [e.g., Consolidated Edition, Long Island 
Power Authority, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, New York Power Authority (NYPA), 
New York State Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSEG), Central Hudson Gas and Elec 
Corporation (CHGEC), Orange and Rockland Utility Inc., and Rochester Gas and Electric 
Corp (RG&E)] to explore the characteristics, nuances, structure, and approaches applied. 
4.1. From centralized models to distributed system platforms 
Retail peak electricity demand in NYS is approximately 75% greater than the average system 
load, and nearly 9% of power generated in the state is lost in transmission [47]. Essential 
investment needed through 2025 to replace the state’s aging infrastructure to meet projected 
energy demand is estimated at $30 billion [43]. REV is thus a ‘polycentric’ strategy intended 
to make distribution planning more transparent and better integrated. For instance, it seeks 
to transform electric distribution companies into DSP providers with responsibility for active 
coordination of DERs. It fosters “transactive energy” ecosystem in which “consumers and 
other parties can take full advantage of every type of energy resource—on both sides of the 
meter” [45]. Key to this ambitious goal is reorienting the traditional regulatory model by 
aligning utility and consumer interests so that both groups benefit from (scalable) improved 
market efficiency and scalable organizational learning.  
Two pricing mechanisms offer a critical role in this regard. First, REV establishes benefit-cost 
analyses as a foundational procurement tool to determine renewable electricity deployment 
[48]. Chosen due to its regulatory familiarity and apparent simplicity [49], the multi-year 
distribution system integration plans (DSIPs) to be developed by utilities seeks to foster a fair, 
open and value-based decision-making environment for utilities to build out their own 
capabilities in the DER market [45]. The benefit-cost approach will be applied in DSP 
investments, procurement of DERs through competitive selection and tariffs, and energy 
efficiency programs. Second, REV proposes using locational marginal pricing (LMP) 
principles to optimize the value of distributed utilities. Application of LMP principles can 
help distinguish which configuration of distributed resources enhances system flexibility and 
yield overall best value to consumers [44]. In terms of a repurposed DER policy, market 
development, innovation in designing value strategy and benefit-cost of DSIPs, and 
investment in community-choice aggregation programs, the REV model shares some of these 
characteristics with other ambitious and successful initiatives, particularly the German 
Energiewende initiative [50]. New York is not alone in its efforts to improve its utility 
regulation market and optimal system efficiencies. Parallel regulatory actions have been 
proposed in California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Illinois through its proposed 
utility of the future study known as 'NextGrid' [51]. However, REV represents the most 
promising utility-as-platform business model as it challenges two fundamental components 
of the conventional utility model: the assumption that electricity demand is inelastic, and the 
notion that economies of scale make a centralized generating model the most economical way 
for electricity services provision [52] and market development. Table 2 summarizes the main 
policy, regulatory, and challenges that utilities and planners can consider towards improving 
DMS and UCM based on polycentric approach to business-model innovations. 
Policy, regulatory, and challenges for advancing polycentric innovation Author (s) 
Information asymmetry, capital expenditure bias, and time-varying rates. [53,54] 
Distribution utilities and their place in an integrated grid model to provide 
infrastructure services, enhance personalization, and value creation. [1] 
Energy performance contracting, regulation of retail energy markets, and 
innovation of revenue and pricing models. 
[16,55]  
DERs, DSPs, benefit-cost analysis framework, and net energy metering. [3,55,56] 
Institutionalized polycentric innovations in energy governance, and 
sociotechnical co-evolution of energy planning and policymaking. [10,38,39]  
Marginal-cost-based dynamic pricing, and time-varying electricity rates. [47] 
Utility financial incentives, investments, utility of the future roadmaps: 
(smart grid development, DERs, and customer utility service model). [45,57] 
Electric grid modernization and polycentric governance (democratized 
energy paradigm). [45,46] 
Table 2. Policy, regulatory, and actions for polycentric innovation 
4.1. Application of the Hamel Framework to the REV Docket 
Table 3 offers a four-part, multi-dimensional, Hamel analytical framework and application of 
the key dimensions to REV. These dimensions extend beyond business-model innovation in 
the utility industry. These dimensions attempt to account for the increasing focus on 
performance-based utility operation, the relationship dynamics that accompany such a shift 
[58] and the required transition to a servitization system—as mandated by system reliability 
and resiliency, system-wide efficiency, and the climate change challenge [3]. 
Component Definition REV features 
Strategic 
resources 
Depicts the architecture 
of the utility value 
creation. Includes 
strategic assets, know-
how, core processes and 
competencies. 
An estimated $30 billions of investment in the 
state’s aging grid infrastructure is required by 
2025. 
NYSERDA’s Clean Energy Fund provides $5B 
investment in new green energy over 10 years, 
starting in 2016. 
Customer 
interface 
Greater customer 
interactions, including 
customer relationship, 
segmentation, 
fulfilment support, and 
revenue structure. 
REV promotes greater consumer choice. 
Emphasizes enhanced customer-centric 
paradigm (e.g., billing solutions for effective 
management). 
Nonlinear transactions. 
Value 
network 
Includes utility added 
values or business 
offerings to resource 
providers, suppliers, 
and partners. 
Removes market barriers and promotes 
distributed utilities. 
Promotes greater interaction among DSPs to 
create a market pricing platform, and service 
monetization. 
 
Core 
strategy 
The utility’s capacity to 
change course in the 
face of potential 
existential business 
model risks.  
This capacity is 
influenced by the 
flexibility and 
complexity of both the 
business model but also 
the infrastructure it 
operates.  
Distribution utilities act as DSPs. 
Energy efficiency savings are part of utility 
revenue not dedicated surcharge. 
Earning impact mechanisms (EIM) replace 
platform service revenues (PSR) and market 
based earnings (MBE). 
Includes modified clawback mechanisms to 
attract third parties. 
Encourages time of use (TOU) rates. 
Each utility submit benefit-cost-analysis plan. 
Table 3. Application of Hamel business model to conventional energy utility 
4.1.1. Strategic resources and opportunities: Utility assets 
There are four main types of electric utilities in NYS, namely investor-owned private utilities, 
retail-power marketers, state-owned public authorities, and municipal utilities. These utilities 
can be grouped into two service types: bundled and delivery. Several organizations have 
institutional capabilities, mandates, and responsibilities for managing utility customer choice 
archetypes in New York (Figure 4). Eventually, NYSERDA may emerge as the hub of such 
polycentric activities. However, a more polycentric governance approach could potentially 
emerge across and between several bodies as institutional innovation takes root, with 
organizations such as the NYPSC and FERC providing oversight mechanisms for greater 
transparency in utility rate design, wholesale market regulations, and DER integration, and 
organizations like the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and New York 
State Reliability Council (NYSRC), establishing greater degrees of reliability standards. This 
polycentric innovation development could help minimize information asymmetries and 
strategic behavior such as disguising true expected future costs to the regulator to increase 
allowed revenues or returns. As the NYPSC contends, “asymmetry regarding system 
information if continued will result in a barrier to new market entry by third parties and 
ultimately impede innovation and customer choice” [44]. On the other hand, New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO)—a non-profit organization set up by NYS—could 
emerge as the central open platform for procuring DERs from suppliers. NYISO currently 
administers wholesale electricity markets in the state and provides reliability planning for 
bulk-electricity power, but this function could expand with the growth of DERs especially 
bulk power generation. Ultimately, NYISO would continue to oversee the wholesale 
electricity markets in NYS while FERC regulates wholesale electricity rates, licenses 
hydroelectric projects, and sets policies for interstate electricity sales. Under FERC Order 745, 
FERC regulates wholesale product tariffs by independent system operators (ISO) such as 
NYISO—including integration of DERs into wholesale markets [45]. 
 
Figure 4. NYS electric industry participants and institutions 
The state’s strategic resources and utility assets are owned, operated, and regulated by a 
variety of private and public entities (Figure 4). The functions provided by this complex 
electricity infrastructure create a path dependency in which existing business models either 
enable or constrain energy market development. The resulting utility landscape that manages 
the flows of all these energy resources has experienced consolidation to the point at which, in 
2015, a “baker’s dozen” of three holding companies (namely Consolidated Edition, Long 
Island Power Authority, and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation) representing 2.4% of all 
integrated utilities controlled 49% of utility revenues [4]. The REV model fully addresses the 
subcomponents of strategic resources (core competencies, strategic assets, and core processes) 
of the utility industry such as the aging infrastructure challenge. It supports what Reference 
[59] refers to as “infrastructure to services transition”, or the “evolution of infrastructure for 
commodity delivery” to support greater personalization of value—new purposes, new 
platforms, enabled new infrastructure, and new applications (services). 
4.1.2. Customer interface: Increasing customer choice and control 
REV empowers customers with meaningful level of choice and reduces cost-of-service of 
electricity consumption. For instance, it improves electricity billing system and knowledge of 
customer analytics, and animates the market with substantial choice offering about the 
consumption and provision of electricity services (e.g., from whom to procure electricity 
services and from what resources) [45,46]. Conventional electric utilities compete by 
establishing utility-consumer relationship characterized by billing-based interactions that are 
impersonal, distant, and standardized. This distant aspect arises partly due to primary 
fiduciary obligation to the owners and shareholders of the company. Additionally, 
conventional utilities are characterized by less customer interactions as they do not go 
“beyond-the-meter.”  
 
Figure 5. Number of utilities, by ownership from 2008-2015 
Fundamental to optimizing behind-the-meter storage assets and DERs like rooftop solar is 
sharing of distribution-level data of the utility grid and common understanding of its 
distribution system. In 2015, a total of 124 utilities operated in New York with investor-owned 
utilities accounting for 12% of the total market share, representing 71% of customers (Figure 
5). Behind the meter, cooperative, municipal, retail power marketer, and state utilities 
accounted for 9.7%, 0.8%, 9.7%, 65.3%, and 2.4% of the total market ownership, respectively. 
Investor-owned utilities operate under conditions of a guaranteed rate of return that is set by 
NYPSC. In the conventional business model, utilities invest in large-scale asset, economies of 
scale, and long-term infrastructural commitments that determine the form of the revenue/cost 
structure. These features still influence portfolio of electricity sales, revenues, and customer 
numbers of certain utilities in New York, even as the implementation of the REV model is 
ongoing. Behind-the-meter recorded the fastest growth in electricity revenues, sales, and 
customer count of 89.4%, 78.6%, and 68.7% in 2015, respectively. Under REV, DSP providers 
“create markets, tariffs, and operational systems to enable behind the meter resource 
providers to monetize products and services that will provide value to the utility system and 
thus to all customers” [43]. 
4.1.3. Value network: Expanding customer-base 
The business model of the traditional utility pursues expansion in asset-based and, through 
its commodity-focused strategy, increases shareholders value. The goal of the conventional 
utility, as such, can be conceptually positioned at one end of a profit-motivation spectrum: the 
“motivation to build incremental assets for the primary purpose of expanding its rate-base” 
[60]. Because regulators reward or chastise utilities for decisions to achieve certain public-
policy goals and to maintain “just and reasonable revenues,” this model faces mounting 
challenges—especially in a DER framework. So-called “incentive regulation,” however, 
establishes the working conditions of the utility. Within these conditions, “[g]iven any set of 
regulations, utilities participate in actions which most benefit their principal constituencies—
shareholders and management—while meeting the requirements of the regulations” [61]. 
Because the principal constituency of the investor-owned utility is its shareholder base, REV 
seeks to expand utility customer-base through value addition to scaling economic efficiency. 
4.1.4. Core strategy: Animating business-model innovation 
All the major distribution utilities in New York support the REV vision for long-term 
innovation in the industry and have submitted proposals for pilot projects. Additionally, a 
number of utilities have began implementing “flexibility products and services” such as 
distributed solar PV inverters, real-time transactions, demand response, and pricing of 
reserves that would enable them to obtain electricity from the most flexible resources.  
Response to these market changes, however, depends on adaptations in the utility regulatory 
landscape. Nevertheless, the dependence of the modern society on a stable and reliable 
electricity system require that these innovations should be ongoing throughout the lifetime of 
the electricity grid infrastructure. 
The transition from centralized to decentralized renewable electricity governance animates 
business-model innovations to address “death spiral” concerns and inefficient resource 
allocation. REV’s core strategy addresses market risks in New York by increasing DER 
deployment, increasing transparency in utility ownership, incentivizing low-carbon 
electricity generation, and aligning utility profits with DER deployment [45]. However, as [36] 
and [62] caution, these innovations must not be construed as attempts at regime preservation 
rather than market adaptations for fostering ‘polycentric’ business-model innovation. In other 
words, the REV docket’s core strategy positions political and economic innovations of the 
utility landscape to optimize customer-focused operations and return on environment. For 
instance, the role of the ESCOs which currently provide only commodity services (e.g., energy 
efficiency investments) are expanded to include more classes of electricity services including 
consulting and analytic services to help consumers dynamically manage their energy bills. 
5. Conclusion 
The key objective of this chapter is to evaluate the viability of the Hamel business model and 
its application to evaluating the New York’s REV vision and the state’s path for optimizing 
distributed energy future and customer choice. The Hamel framework proved to be a 
valuable analytical business model methodology in this context. The chapter reveals that 
residential and commercial rooftop solar electricity generation systems is expanding in New 
York led by behind-the-meter facilities producing power intended for on-site consumption in 
homes, office facilities, and commercial buildings. Our findings show that New York utilities 
are increasingly investing in behind-the-meter renewable energy projects. Utilities favor these 
customer-side projects which recorded the fastest growth in electricity revenues, sales, and 
customers in 2016 of 89.4%, 78.6%, and 68.7%, respectively. 
The chapter sheds lights on the growing influence of business-model innovations and the 
New York’s REV docket in optimizing utility customer choice management and distribute 
system planning of electricity services. This research shows that implementation of the REV 
vision in a polycentric fashion offers significant benefits to all customers, not just those that 
subscribe to them, by generating richer innovations in pricing plans, consumer choice 
management, and customer analytics to improve utility operations and customer satisfaction. 
The expansion of renewable electricity market in New York would be impossible without 
support from state and federal policymakers. Although key polices and market regulations 
including community choice aggregation, net metering, clean energy fund, dynamic load 
management, low income affordability, and utility energy efficiency proposals have been 
proposed and even in some cases implemented in NYS to improve the development of 
distributed utilities and services, significant improvement in regulatory and market reforms 
is still required to eliminate market, financial, and economic barriers and skewed incentives 
that presently impede the efficient evolution of the utility sector. One of the key market 
development needs is thus to emphasize heavily improvement in the utilities’ business-model 
innovation capabilities through external partnerships and suitable organizational structures 
that promotes an integrated renewable electricity utility market statewide.  
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